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Abstract: Punishment is a popular tool when governing commons in situations where free 
riders would otherwise take over. It is well known that sanctioning systems, such as the 
police and courts, are costly and thus can suffer from those who free ride on other’s efforts to 
maintain the sanctioning systems (second-order free riders). Previous game-theory studies 
showed that if populations are very large, pool punishment rarely emerges in public good 
games, even when participation is optional, because of second-order free riders. Here we 
show that a matching fund for rewarding cooperation leads to the emergence of pool 
punishment, despite the presence of second-order free riders. We demonstrate that reward 
funds can pave the way for a transition from a population of free riders to a population of 
pool punishers. A key factor in promoting the transition is also to reward those who 
contribute to pool punishment, yet not abstaining from participation. Reward funds 
eventually vanish in raising pool punishment, which is sustainable by punishing the second-
order free riders. This suggests that considering the interdependence of reward and 
punishment may help to better understand the origins and transitions of social norms and 
institutions.
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Cooperation is costly in the commons dilemma. The evolution of cooperation among 
nonrelatives with social learning has been a persistent issue approached interdisciplinary, as 
more than a biological issue1,2. Needless to say, those who free ride on the cooperation of 
others are better off than those who cooperate, unless structural changes are considered in the 
individual payoff. As is well known, various selective incentives, such as reward, punishment, 
or ostracism, have been used to modify payoff structures and curb human behaviors3,4. Thus 
far, theoretical and experimental studies have mostly focused on punishment5,6, which can 
sustain a high level of cooperation in providing public goods7-9. 
The evolution of punishment, however, remains a challenging puzzle6,10-12. Punishing is 
costly. It is thus not an easy task to explore if and how costly punishment pays11. Previous 
studies on the evolution of punishment have also demonstrated that differences in the details 
of punishment schemes, in particular when a punisher’s cost is incurred, can have a large 
effect13,14. One representative type that has been most studied is informal or peer punishment. 
Peer punishment is inductively modeled, being typically described as: because you wronged 
me (or someone), I will punish you. As such, peer punishment depends on the assessment of 
past behaviors15. 
Continuing costly punishment itself is another public good and thus peer punishment can 
pave the way for regression to the punishment of free riders through peer punishment 
(second-order punishment)4,7,16. In the same way, third-order punishment and so on are 
applied. This will result in an infinite regress of costly punishments. Or in situations in which 
punishment against contributors or retaliation is allowed, these acts can offset the payoff 
advantage of the existing prosocial punishers over free riders17,18. People afraid of antisocial 
and counter punishments thus might shift the responsibility for sanctioning to others19. 
Along this line of thinking, we turn to another representative type of punishment, formal or 
pool punishment. Pool punishment is a “preemption” system that is set in place before 
forming joint enterprises (i.e., a public good game) and without knowing if there is a free 
rider among the participants, and subsequently each participant is offered the opportunity to 
contribute to a fund for pool punishment12,14,20-25. Recent studies show that considering 
second-order punishment results in pool punishment becoming more effective than peer 
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punishment for stabilizing a cooperative state and participants are more likely to prefer pool 
punishment over peer punishment14,23,26,27. In pool punishment, it is assumed that a 
centralized authority, once established, can exclusively control the incentives, so that it 
suppresses non-responsible punishment and excludes the possibility of free riders higher than 
second-order. 
Apart from the issue of system stabilization, there still remains another issue relevant for the 
evolution of costly punishment: the emergence problem. Indeed, punishing right and left in 
large populations of free riders will require considerable effort and expense for pool 
punishers. Reflecting this, it is often explicitly assumed that pool punishment becomes active 
if at least a threshold number of players, more than one, contribute to it28,29,30. This means 
that in such large populations it is not easy to successfully start up costly punishment31,32, 
even with considering punishment of second-order free riders33 (Fig. 1a,b). 
For the last decade, several attempts have tried to resolve the emergence problem. Most of 
the theoretical results have been based on assuming small, finite populations and analyzing 
those stochastic dynamics13,24,34-36. In addition, optional participation and mutual aid games 
(MAGs) have been considered as key factors in a resolution14,22,25. When participation in 
games is optional, players can simply escape a social trap of mutual defection37,38. MAGs are 
variants of public good games (PGGs). In PGGs the resulting benefits are shared equally 
among all members in the group. In MAGs it is not allowed to benefit from one’s own 
contribution to the public goods provision13,20. That is, MAGs deal with excludable goods, 
not public goods, and combined with optional participation, are also two-fold exclusion. As 
such, previous studies have shed light on excludable good games in small populations. 
Here we turn to pool reward39,40, thereby we tackle the emergence of pool punishment in non-
excludable good games in very large populations. We model a situation like a matching fund 
that usually arises for charity or common goods, in which contributors donate to a nonprofit 
source outside. Then the external source, enhancing the input, will make returns to a broader 
range of beneficiaries that include the contributors. Previous studies have investigated reward 
and punishment, often comparatively41-45, and have also examined the selection or interplay 
of these incentives46-52. It is thus surprising that little is known about what happens if those 
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who commit to pool punishment are promptly rewarded, rather than through iterated 
interactions or reputation. 
Rewarding is costly. The pool reward being considered allows for receiving self-returns from 
one’s own contribution as well as sharing in other’s contribution without contributing, similar 
to PGGs. It follows that a pool reward can suffer from those who take a free ride on the 
reward-fund raising. From the viewpoint of its initiator, rather than punishing, rewarding can 
be less expensive and thus more efficiently stimulate cooperative behaviors4,43,46,52. Indeed, 
voluntary rewarding can be maintained even in public good games with second-order free 
riders39,53. It is thus predicted that a pool reward that also rewards volunteers to pool 
punishment will provide a foothold for the initially rare volunteers to proliferate, overcoming 
the emergence problem even without the assistance of the optional participation. We shall 
confirm this prediction by using the following game-theoretical model.  
Methods 
Evolutionary games for a public good and multi-strategy interactions. We consider a 
well-mixed, infinitely large population. We assume that a player is more likely to adopt other 
player’s strategy earning a higher payoff (“imitate better”). In the population this can be 
implemented by considering replicator dynamics54,55. We analyze the replicator dynamics for 
five strategies that consist of four types of participants in the PGGs: (i) cooperators (C) 
contribute to the PGG, but not to the incentive funds; (ii) defectors (D) do not contribute at 
all; (iii) punishers (P) contribute to the PGG and to the punishment fund; (iv) rewarders 
contribute to the PGG and to the reward fund (R); and (v) non-participants (N). We denote as 
xS and PS the relative frequency and expected payoff for each strategy S = C, D, P, R, or N 
(thus, 0 ≤ xS ≤1  and xSS∑ =1). The replicator dynamics for the five strategies are given 
by !xS = xS (PS −P) , in which P  describes the average payoff over the population, that is 
P = xSPSS∑ . 
Game procedure and parameters. A group for the public good interaction consists of n > 1 
members who are randomly chosen from the population. First, each of the members is offered 
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an opportunity to participate in the PGG. If participating, then each participant will be 
subsequently offered distinct opportunities to contribute, to the reward, then the punishment, 
and finally PGG. Each contribution to the PGG, reward or punishment fund means an 
investment of c1, c2, c3 > 0, respectively, at a cost to the contributor itself. In the PGG, the 
resulting benefits, multiplied by factors r1 > 1, are equally shared by all participants, 
excluding N-players. To examine a previous, problematic situation in which C, D, and N 
coexist, in particular we assume that 2 < r1 < n37. In the reward fund, the resulting rewards, 
multiplied by intermediate factors r2 with 1 < r2 < n, is shared, yet not always equally, among 
all of the contributors to the PGG (C-, R-, and P-players), excluding D- and N-players39,40,43. 
We assume weights kRP, kRR ≥ 0 for the P- and R-players’ share. In the punishment fund, non-
contributors to the punishment (D-, C-, and R-players) incur fines. We assume that the fines 
are proportional to the contribution accumulated over all P-players14,20, with proportionality 
factor r3 > 1 and weights kPC, kPR ≥ 0 for the C- and R-players’ fines. Finally, the fifth type 
(v) non-participant is a loner that independently earns a small payoff g > 0. Hence, we have 
the individual payoff for an interaction, fS, of each strategy S = C, D, P, R, or N, as follows: 
fC =
b1(nC + nR + nP +1)
n-nN
 -c1 +
b2nR
(nC +1)+ kRRnR + kRPnP
       -kPCb3nP,
fD =
b1(nC + nR + nP )
n-nN
                                                           -b3nP,
fP =
b1(nC + nR + nP +1)
n-nN
 -c1 +
kRPb2nR
nC + kRRnR + kRP (nP +1)
       -c3,
fR =
b1(nC + nR + nP +1)
n-nN
 -c1 +
kRRb2 (nR +1)
nC + kRR (nR +1)+ kRPnP
 -c2  -kPRb3nP,
fN = g,
    (1) 
in which nS denotes the number of S-player among (n - 1) co-players, b1= r1c1, b2 = r2c2, and 
b3 = r3c3. The expected payoff for each strategy is given by 
PS =
(n−1)!
nC !nD!nP !nR!nN !
xCnC xDnD xPnP xRnR xNnN fSnC+nD+nP+nR+nN=n−10≤nC ,nD ,nP ,nR ,nN≤n−1∑
, in which 
(n−1)!
nC !nD!nP !nR!nN !
xCnC xDnD xPnP xRnR xNnN  describes the probability of finding the specific (n - 1) co-
players which includes nS S-players (S = C, D, P, R, and N). 
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Here, it has been assumed that there are participants of more than one, and if a participant is 
single, she or he acts as a non-participant and earns the same payoff g31,37. In the model we 
consider that the reward weight kRP and kRR describe an extra bonus for the one who 
contributed not only the PGG but also another public fund. Thus, kRP and kRR are supposed to 
be greater than 1. In the punishment weights, kPC and kPR are usually smaller than 1, denoting 
a discount factor for the one who did the second-order but not first-order free riding. For 
simplicity, we hereafter assume that kRR - 1 and kPR offset each other and in particular kRR = 1 
and kPR = 0. 
Results 
We, in terms of evolutionary game theory54, show that voluntary rewarding for pool 
punishers can lead to a state in which all are P-players, no matter whether participation is 
compulsory or optional.  
Stability of a coercive society. We start with analyzing local stability of the all-P state. In 
particular for the all-P state to be robust for the invasion of a rare C-player, we consider 
second-order punishment with kPCr3 > 1/(n - 1), under which there is no temptation to switch 
to C when all play P, unless specifically stated otherwise. It is not difficult to also know from 
equation (1) under which conditions the all-P state is stable against the invasion of a rare D- 
or N-player. In the case of D this is when c1(1 - r1/n) < c3[(n - 1)r3 - 1] holds, where the left 
and right sides describe the marginal costs for cooperating in PGGs and for being punished 
by n - 1 punishers, respectively. In the case of N the condition is that g < c1(r1 - 1) - c3, where 
the right side means the payoff for the group of all P-players. 
Conditions of rock-scissors-paper cycles. It is known that there can exist two kinds of 
periodic cycles among three strategies. It is clear that the last inequality above is also a 
sufficient condition that C dominates N. Considering also that N dominates D with g > 0 and 
that D dominates C with r1 < n, it follows that when the PGG multiplication factor r1 is 
greater than 2, C-, D-, and N-players alternatively become dominant in the population37,38. 
Otherwise, the population which consists of the three strategies will end up with a 
homogeneous state in which all play N37. We thus focus on PGGs with r1 > 2 (and thus n > 2) 
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in what follows. In addition, to hold such periodic oscillations among another triplet C-, D-, 
and R-players, it is necessary that c1(1 - r1/n) < c2(r2 – 1) holds39. Based on these rock-
scissors-paper-type cycles, we shall investigate the evolutionary dynamics for more than 
three strategies. 
With no reward, pool punishment never emerges (Fig. 1a,b). We first consider 
combinations of C-, D-, P-players with or without N-players. We show that no P-players 
evolve if they are initially very rare, whatever the condition of participation. Let us start by 
compulsory participation (Fig. 1a). In a population which exclusively consists of P and D (or 
C), the replicator dynamics exhibit a bi-stable system: depending on the initial fraction of P-
players in the population, the population can evolve either to a state of all P-players or a state 
of all D-players (or all C-players). By assumption D-players are always better off than C-
players. Thus, for the three strategies, the dynamics exhibit bistability of the two 
homogeneous states for P-players or D-players (all-P state and all-D state). Next is in the case 
of optional participation (Fig. 1b). In competition among three strategies C, D, and N, it is 
supposed that the CDN face is filled with periodic closed orbits surrounding a center37 (see 
Supplementary Fig. S1 for detailed phase portraits on the faces). For a coexisting state of C, 
D, and N within the CDN face, a rare, innovative P-player cannot invade, because the time 
average of the transversal growth rate (i.e., difference of the expected payoff of a rare P-payer 
and the average payoff over the population) for the rare P-player is negative per punishing 
cost c3, which is the same as in the case of peer punishment31. Thus, in the given parameter 
settings, the dynamics exhibit bistability of the all-P state and periodic oscillations among C, 
D, and N (see Supplementary Fig. S2 for time series).  
With reward, pool punishment emerges for compulsory participation (Figs. 1c and 2a). 
Replacing non-participation with a pool reward only leads to the similar dynamics on the 
corresponding CDR face, which is filled with periodic closed orbits surrounding a center39 
(Supplementary Fig. S1). It is obvious that the dynamics on the CDP face are unchanged. 
With an extra reward for P-players with kRP > 1, the even rare P-player can be encouraged to 
invade the coexisting population on the CDR face. Numerical simulations show that the 
population state will typically come close to the DPR face, increasing in the fraction of P-
players and decreasing in that of C-players. This is because of second-order punishment. 
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Among the three strategies of D, P, and R, the dynamics are repelling (Supplementary Fig. 
S1). As time goes by, the trajectories of population states will converge to the boundaries 
connecting the three homogenous states for D, P, and R. Considering that P-players are better 
off than R-players and R-players are better off than D-players, it is understood that the 
trajectories will be attracted to the all-P state, which again is robust for invasions of rare D- or 
C-players. 
Pool reward emerges for optional participation (Fig. 3). To expand the applicable range of 
pool-reward, we also consider a case where participation is optional. It turns out that with 
sufficiently high degrees of the reward multiplication factor r2, rare R-players can invade the 
CDN face, replacing N-players. The population state will eventually be attracted to a periodic 
orbit on the DNR face (see Supplementary Fig. S1 for detailed phase portraits on the faces). 
We remark that despite the fact that C-players exploit rewards by R-players, R-players can 
sprout in the presence of these second-order free riders. The successful invasion of a rare R-
player deserves an example of the well-known Simpson’s paradox37,56,57 for second-order 
social dilemmas: in spite of the burden of costs for rewarding in each game, the rare R-
player’s payoff, when it is averaged over the whole population, will be better than the 
second-order free rider C-player’s payoff13,58. This is in striking contrast to the former case in 
pool punishment (Fig. 1b). The DNR face, shared in Fig. 1c, is an “interface” to connect to 
the evolution of pool punishment and thus opens the door to the full course of the five 
strategies, as in what follows. 
With reward, pool punishment emerges for optional participation (Fig. 2b). The initial 
state of the population almost exclusively consists of C-, D-, and N-players, and R- and P-
players are given only at very small rates. The population first follows periodic oscillations 
among the resident three strategies. Similar to the last case, the initially rare R-players then 
start to gradually spread in the population, replacing N-players. The R-players then can take 
over almost all of the population. However, the all-P state finally arrives, substituting R-
players. Without the intermediate sequence of a rise and fall of voluntary rewarding, we can 
only have continuous oscillations among C, D, and N. 
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With no second-order punishment, pool punishment is unstable (Supplementary Figs. S3 
and S4). We explore effects of no punishment of C-players, who do not shoulder the 
punishment fee c3 > 0. It is obvious that with no second-order punishment, C dominates P: 
switching the strategy from P to C is beneficial, whatever others do (see equation (1) with kPC 
= 0). Therefore, the all-P state is unstable against the C’s invasion and a small random shock 
will cause that a population of P-players will converge to a boundary state that completely 
excludes P-players. For compulsory participation with no reward, thus such a population will 
be eventually attracted by the all-D state (Supplementary Fig. S3a), and for optional 
participation with no reward, by cycles among C, D, and N (Supplementary Fig. S3b). With 
pool reward, however, the bonus weight for P-players kRP > 1 can lead populations to 
temporally increase in P-players. The trajectories of population states then can converge to 
heteroclinic cycles, among C, D, R, and P for compulsory participation (Supplementary Figs. 
S3c and S4a). In particular, for optional participation the population will stay at an almost-all-
N state for a long time on a heteroclinic cycle connecting the five homogeneous states for C, 
D, N, R, and P (Supplementary Fig. S4b). 
We examine our main results for a certain range of the model parameters and initial 
conditions. Our main results that reward funds facilitate the emergence of costly pool 
punishment are robust against the various initial conditions, whether participation is optional 
or not (Supplementary Fig. S5). In particular we numerically explore the lower bound of the 
reward weight for punishers kRP, with various settings of other parameters, r1, r2, c2, and c3 
(Figs. 4b,d and Supplementary Fig. S6). In Figs. 1c and 2b we also investigate effects of (i) 
different group sizes n, (ii) different combinations of multiplication factors in PGGs and 
reward funds, r1 and r2 (Fig. 4a,c), (iii) nonlinearity of benefit production functions 
(Supplementary Text S1 and Fig. S7), and (iv) pool punishment which imposes constant fees. 
None of the variants (i)-(iv) qualitatively affect the main results. 
Discussion 
Carrot or stick? This is a commonly used dichotomy in studies on selective incentives. Here 
we have focused on interdependence of reward and punishment. The evolution of costly 
punishment indeed will be promoted provided ample positive incentives that covers its net 
10 
cost. In the case preferring costly punishment is a rational behavior. Thus, the core problem 
has been whether efforts to provide such rewards can endogenously evolve. Only a few 
studies have explored the evolution of a meta-norm that rewards peer punishers59-62. We have 
instead considered pool reward in n-person public good games, which can proliferate when 
rare even in the presence of second-order free riders. We examined a mediation effect of pool 
reward on overcoming the emergence problem of pool punishment. It turned out that 
considering pool reward leads to completing an evolutionary transition of societies in 
different equilibrium states, with norm deviators or norm followers. The latter state is 
protected by pool punishment.  
Looking back to the real world, a law for an official subsidy or tax reduction to smoothly 
promote social changes (e.g., green cars and eco-friendly home) often includes its own 
expiration conditions. In our model, with achievement of a foothold for the evolution of pool 
punishment, the pool reward becomes evolutionarily retired. These mediation dynamics can 
be seen for variants of the model. For instance, rewarding mediation is applicable to 
nonlinear public good games in which the benefit production function has decreasing returns 
to scale32. This is also in threshold public good games in which a certain level of cooperation 
is required for producing public goods40,63. In either case, considering a sufficiently concave 
benefit function, the homogeneous state for cooperators turns into a stable state and even 
punishing free riders is redundant to maintain cooperation.  
The essence of sustaining pool punishment is its prior commitment scheme followed by 
second-order punishment. Exploring if and how such a commitment system can emerge is out 
of the range of the model considered. Second-order punishment has been found to effectively 
prevent second-order free riders from eroding the voluntary sanctioning system7,64,65. In the 
case of peer punishment, it has also been reported that second-order punishment is not likely 
to be observed62. In contrast to this, pool punishment of second-order free riders is often 
conspicuously observed (i.e., against tax evaders). However, each individual is not supposed 
to transcendentally abide by the norm of pool punishment. In particular, in the very beginning 
when people never had concepts of pool punishment and thus there are also second-order free 
riders, how does a norm that assesses second-order free riders as bad emerge?66 A better 
understanding of this could be relevant to the quest to understand the “roots of sanctioning 
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institutions”23. As such, the fascinating origin of norm assessment for second-order pool 
punishment deserves further investigation. 
Nowadays, various modern issues of commons, such as energy, natural environment, and 
climate change, are reaching every corner and covering all stages of human lives. As such, it 
appears that there is almost no time or space for people to opt out of both the corresponding 
dilemma situations and the related laws34,67. Results, based on compulsory participation but 
voluntary rewards, thus could be more applicable than previous theories with optional 
participation14,34. This implies an improved scenario to accomplish Garrett Hardin’s recipe 
for the commons: mutual coercion mutually agreed upon1. In Isaiah Berlin’s concept68, 
optional participation (with “leaving loners alone”36) can be viewed as a negative liberty, 
freedom from interference in individual payoff by other players.  
In contrast to this, voluntary rewards could be a positive liberty, freedom aimed at modifying 
the payoff of others. Recent studies have also shown that participants who enable an effect on 
one another through a majority vote prefer a coercive society with second-order pool 
punishment27. We have revealed that in a broad range of conditions with large populations, 
non-excludable public goods, or general benefit functions, only having optional participation 
is often not sufficient32,67, but when combined with voluntary rewards, can be effective for 
establishing pool punishment. All in all, the results may suggest: through positive liberty, 
corrective coercion. 
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Figure 1 | Evolution of pool punishment. With no reward, (a) bistability of states with all P-
players (P node) or all D-players (D node) for compulsory participation or (b) bistability of 
the P node or periodic oscillations among C, D, and N for optional participation. (c) Replace 
non-participant N with R. As in panel b, on the CDR face the population states oscillate along 
periodic closed orbits. In contrast to panels a and b, rare P-players, rewarded, can invade to 
the CDR face. Typically, the population state will converge to the DPR face, on which the 
dynamics is repelling. The trajectory then will come close to the edges connecting the three 
nodes D, P, and R, and finally attain the P node. Parameter values are: n = 5, c1 = 1, r1 = 3, c2 
= 1, r2 = 2, c3 = 0.1, r3 = 1.6, kRP = 2, kPC = 1, and g = 1. The system includes second-order 
punishment. Open and filled circles denote, respectively, unstable and asymptotically stable 
equilibria. 
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Figure 2 | Via reward to punishment. Time series of the frequencies of five strategies C 
(blue), D (red), P (purple), R (green), and N (yellow). (a) Participation is compulsory and 
thus N is excluded. Initially, C, D, and R are common and P is very rare. The population first 
follows periodic oscillations among C, D, and R. The rare P gradually invades and then takes 
over. (b) The initial state R and P are very rare. This population first follows periodic 
oscillations among C, D, and N. The rare R gradually invades and then takes over. The 
homogeneous state of P finally arrives, substituting the existence of R-players. Parameter 
values are as in Fig. 1. Initial conditions are: (xC, xD, xP, xR, xN) = (0.4, 0.2999, 0.0001, 0.3, 0) 
for panel a, or (0.4, 0.2998, 0.0001, 0.0001, 0.3) for panel b. The system includes second-
order punishment.
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Figure 3 | Via withdrawal to reward. Participation is optional. Initially, C, D, and N are 
common and R is very rare. The population first follows periodic oscillations among C, D, 
and N. The rare R gradually invades the population, substituting the existence of N-players. 
The dynamics shift to periodic oscillations among C, D, and R. Parameter values are as in Fig. 
1.
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Figure 4 | Effects of reward cost and weight on the evolution of pool punishment. Initial 
conditions are: (xC, xD, xP, xR, xN) = (0.33, 0.338, 0.001, 0.001, 0.33) for panels a and b, and 
(xC, xD, xP, xR) = (0.33, 0.339, 0.001, 0.33) for panels c and d. Other parameter values are as 
in Fig. 1. 
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Supplementary Information for 
Voluntary rewards mediate the evolution of pool punishment for 
maintaining public goods in large populations 
 
This file include:  
Supplementary Text, S1 
Supplementary Figures, S1-S7 
Legends for supporting figures, S1-S7 
 
Text S1 Model variants  
Quadratic benefit functions. We can investigate some variants in benefit functions, which 
in the main text have been linear proportionally to c1r1. Here we extensively examine 
quadratic functions for the provision of the total benefit, as follows: B(X) = c1(r12X 2 + r1X) , in 
which X denotes the number of contributors to the public good: X = nC + nP + nR . The first 
term in the right side of equation (1) is replaced with B(X) (n− nN ) . In Supplementary Fig. 
S7 it turns out that concavity with r12 < 0 or convexity with r12 > 0 can lead the center point 
QRC on the CDR face to turn, respectively, into an attractor or a repeller (Supplementary Fig. 
S7).
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Figure S1 | Replicator dynamics on boundaries. Public good games with (a) optional 
participation and pool punishment, (b) compulsory participation and pool reward, or (c) 
optional participation and pool reward. Each simplex component describes a phase portrait 
associated with the replicator dynamics for three strategies displayed at the corners. Open and 
filled circles denote unstable and asymptotically stable equilibria, respectively. The 
corresponding 3-D phase portrait for four strategies is given in Figs. 1b, 1c, or 3.We note that 
for panels a and b the evolutionary dynamics are qualitatively similar on the faces. Indeed, 
the CDP face is common. And, the replicator dynamics on CDN in panel a and CDR in panel 
b lead to cyclical oscillations, on CPN in panel a and CPR in panel b, to bistability for P and 
C, and on DPN in panel a and DPR in panel b, to a repeller on the face and convergence to P. 
Despite this fact, interestingly, the interior dynamics, demonstrated in Figs. 1b and 1c, are 
strikingly contrast to each other in the aspect of bistability. Parameter values are: n = 5, c1 = 1, 
r1 = 3, c2 = 1, r2 = 2, c3 = 0.1, r3 = 1.6, kRP = 2, kPC = 1, and g = 1, as in Fig. 1.
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Figure S2 | Sensitive responses to initial conditions in optional public good games with 
pool punishment. Time series of the frequencies of four strategies, C (blue), D (red), P 
(purple), and N (yellow), corresponding to Fig. 1b. (a) The population continues periodically 
oscillating while the frequency of P gradually decreases and finally vanishes. (b) The initial 
frequencies of P and N are only 0.0001 more are less than those in panel a. The population 
starts with similarly oscillating, then instead of P-players, C-players first vanish, followed by 
extinction of N- and D-players. This leads to attaining the all-P state (which is stable by 
second-order punishment). Parameter values are as in Fig. 1. Initial conditions are: (xC, xD, xP, 
xN) = (0.25, 0.25, 0.2597, 0.2403) for panel a or (0.25, 0.25, 0.2598, 0.2402) for panel b. The 
system has second-order punishment. 
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Figure S3 | Evolution of pool punishment without second-order punishment. The P node 
is no longer stable. (a, b) With no reward. The population can converge to the D node in 
compulsory participation in panel a or the CDN face in optional participation in panel b. (c) 
With reward. The population can converge to the heteroclinic cycle connecting the nodes C, 
D, R, and P in compulsory participation. Parameter values are: n = 5, c1 = 1, r1 = 3, c2 = 1, r2 
= 2, c3 = 0.1, r3 = 1.6, kRP = 2, kPC = 1, and g = 1. Open and filled circles denote unstable and 
asymptotically stable equilibria, respectively. 
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Figure S4 | Cycles without second-order punishment. Time series of the frequencies of 
five strategies C (blue), D (red), P (purple), R (green), and N (yellow). The system has no 
second-order punishment. The homogeneous state of P is no longer stable. Instead the 
population converges to heteroclinic cycles; in particular with optional participation in panel 
a, the population will stay in the homogeneous state of N for a long time. Parameter values 
are as in Fig. 1. Initial conditions are: (xC, xD, xP, xR, xN) = (0.4, 0.2999, 0.0001, 0.3, 0) for 
panel a, or (0.4, 0.2998, 0.0001, 0.0001, 0.3) for panel b. 
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Figure S5 | Effects of initial conditions in compulsory/optional public good games with 
pool reward and punishment. Time series of the frequencies of (a-j) four strategies, C 
(blue), D (red), R (green), and P (purple), (k-v) five strategies, C, D, R, P, and N (yellow). 
Parameter values are as in Fig. 1. Initial conditions are: (xC, xD, xP, xR, xN) = (0.1, 0.39999, 
0.00001, 0.5, 0) for panels a and f, (0.2, 0.39999, 0.00001, 0.4, 0) for panels b and g, (0.3, 
0.39999, 0.00001, 0.3, 0) for panels c and h, (0.4, 0.39999, 0.00001, 0.2, 0) for panels d and i, 
(0.5, 0.39999, 0.00001, 0.1, 0) for panels e and j, (0.05, 0.24998, 0.00001, 0.00001, 0.7) for 
panels k and q, (0.1, 0.24998, 0.00001, 0.00001, 0.65) for panels l and r, (0.15, 0.24998, 
0.00001, 0.00001, 0.6) for panels m and s, (0.2, 0.24998, 0.00001, 0.00001, 0.55) for panels 
n and t, (0.25, 0.24998, 0.00001, 0.00001, 0.5) for panels o and u, or (0.3, 0.24998, 0.00001, 
0.00001, 0.45) for panels p and v.
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Figure S6 | Parameter analyses for different incentive multipliers, costs, and weights. 
Initial conditions are: (xC, xD, xP, xR, xN) = (0.33, 0.338, 0.001, 0.001, 0.33) for panel a, (0.4, 
0.298, 0.001, 0.001, 0.3) panels b and c, (0.33, 0.339, 0.33, 0.001, 0) for panel d, (0.4, 0.299, 
0.001, 0.3, 0) for panels e and f. Other parameter values are as in Fig. 1. 
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Figure S7-1 | Responses to nonlinearity of benefit functions in compulsory public good 
games with pool reward and punishment. The corresponding time series of the relative 
frequencies of four strategies, C, D, R, and P, are in Supplementary Fig. S7-2. (a-c) Concave 
benefit functions lead to an attractor on the CDR face. (d-f) Linear benefit functions lead to 
periodic closed orbits on the CDR face. (g-i) Convex benefit functions lead to a repeller on 
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the CDR face. In spite of those differences in nonlinearity, the population state can eventually 
converge to the all-P state, as the reward weight for punishers kRP are sufficiently large. 
Parameter values are as in Fig. 1. Initial conditions are: (xC, xD, xR, xP) = (0.4, 0.49999, 0.1, 
0.00001).
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Figure S7-2 | Responses to nonlinearity of benefit functions in compulsory public good 
games with pool reward and punishment. Time series of the frequencies of four strategies, 
C (blue), D (red), R (green), and P (purple), corresponding to Supplementary Fig. S7-1. 
 
